files, only scan inside fenced code blocks (between ``` markers) to reduce false positives. Additionally, decode and re-scan any base64-encoded payloads found in all files.

Skip directories:

node_modules

dist

build

.git

coverage

__pycache__

.venv

venv

Skip files:

*.min.js

*.min.css

package-lock.json

yarn.lock

pnpm-lock.yaml

Detection Rules

For each rule, use Grep to search the relevant file types. Record every match with file path, line number, and matched content. For detailed rule patterns, see scan-rules.md.

#	Rule ID	Severity	File Types	Description
1	SHELL_EXEC	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,cjs,py,md	Command execution capabilities
2	AUTO_UPDATE	CRITICAL	js,ts,py,sh,md	Auto-update / download-and-execute
3	REMOTE_LOADER	CRITICAL	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Dynamic code loading from remote
4	READ_ENV_SECRETS	MEDIUM	js,ts,mjs,py	Environment variable access
5	READ_SSH_KEYS	CRITICAL	all	SSH key file access
6	READ_KEYCHAIN	CRITICAL	all	System keychain / browser profiles
7	PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN	CRITICAL	all	Hardcoded private keys
8	MNEMONIC_PATTERN	CRITICAL	all	Hardcoded mnemonic phrases
9	WALLET_DRAINING	CRITICAL	js,ts,sol	Approve + transferFrom patterns
10	UNLIMITED_APPROVAL	HIGH	js,ts,sol	Unlimited token approvals
11	DANGEROUS_SELFDESTRUCT	HIGH	sol	selfdestruct in contracts
12	HIDDEN_TRANSFER	MEDIUM	sol	Non-standard transfer implementations
13	PROXY_UPGRADE	MEDIUM	sol,js,ts	Proxy upgrade patterns
14	FLASH_LOAN_RISK	MEDIUM	sol,js,ts	Flash loan usage
15	REENTRANCY_PATTERN	HIGH	sol	External call before state change
16	SIGNATURE_REPLAY	HIGH	sol	ecrecover without nonce
17	OBFUSCATION	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Code obfuscation techniques
18	PROMPT_INJECTION	CRITICAL	all	Prompt injection attempts
19	NET_EXFIL_UNRESTRICTED	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Unrestricted POST / upload
20	WEBHOOK_EXFIL	CRITICAL	all	Webhook exfiltration domains
21	TROJAN_DISTRIBUTION	CRITICAL	md	Trojanized binary download + password + execute
22	SUSPICIOUS_PASTE_URL	HIGH	all	URLs to paste sites (pastebin, glot.io, etc.)
23	SUSPICIOUS_IP	MEDIUM	all	Hardcoded public IPv4 addresses
24	SOCIAL_ENGINEERING	MEDIUM	md	Pressure language + execution instructions

Risk Level Calculation

Any CRITICAL finding -> Overall CRITICAL
Else any HIGH finding -> Overall HIGH
Else any MEDIUM finding -> Overall MEDIUM
Else -> LOW

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Scan Report

**Target**: <scanned path>
**Risk Level**: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
**Files Scanned**: <count>
**Total Findings**: <count>

### Findings

| # | Risk Tag | Severity | File:Line | Evidence |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| 1 | TAG_NAME | critical | path/file.ts:42 | `matched content` |

### Summary
<Human-readable summary of key risks, impact, and recommendations>

Post-Scan Trust Registration

After outputting the scan report, if the scanned target appears to be a skill (contains a

SKILL.md

file, or is located under a

skills/

directory), offer to register it in the trust registry.

Risk-to-trust mapping:

Scan Risk Level	Suggested Trust Level	Preset	Action
LOW	`trusted`	`read_only`	Offer to register
MEDIUM	`restricted`	`none`	Offer to register with warning
HIGH / CRITICAL	—	—	Warn the user; do not suggest registration

Registration steps (if the user agrees):

Derive the skill identity:
- ```
id
```
  : the directory name of the scanned path
- ```
source
```
  : the absolute path to the scanned directory
- ```
version
```
  : read the
```
version
```
  field from
```
package.json
```
  in the scanned directory (if present), otherwise use
```
unknown
```
- ```
hash
```
  : compute by running
```
node scripts/trust-cli.ts hash --path <scanned_path>
```
  and extracting the
```
hash
```
  field from the JSON output

node scripts/trust-cli.ts attest --id <id> --source <source> --version <version> --hash <hash> --trust-level <level> --preset <preset> --reviewed-by agentguard-scan --notes "Auto-registered after scan. Risk level: <risk_level>." --force

Show the registration result to the user.

If scripts are not available (e.g.,

npm install

was not run), skip this step and suggest the user run

cd skills/agentguard/scripts && npm install

Subcommand: action

Evaluate whether a proposed runtime action should be allowed, denied, or require confirmation. For detailed policies and detector rules, see action-policies.md.

Supported Action Types

```
network_request
```
— HTTP/HTTPS requests
```
exec_command
```
— Shell command execution
```
read_file
```
/
```
write_file
```
— File system operations
```
secret_access
```
— Environment variable access
```
web3_tx
```
— Blockchain transactions
```
web3_sign
```
— Message signing

Decision Framework

Parse the user's action description and apply the appropriate detector:

Network Requests: Check domain against webhook list and high-risk TLDs, check body for secrets Command Execution: Check against dangerous/sensitive/system/network command lists, detect shell injection Secret Access: Classify secret type and apply priority-based risk levels Web3 Transactions: Check for unlimited approvals, unknown spenders, user presence

Default Policies

Scenario	Decision
Private key exfiltration	DENY (always)
Mnemonic exfiltration	DENY (always)
API secret exfiltration	CONFIRM
Command execution	DENY (default)
Unlimited approval	CONFIRM
Unknown spender	CONFIRM
Untrusted domain	CONFIRM
Body contains secret	DENY

Web3 Enhanced Detection

When the action involves web3_tx or web3_sign, use the action-cli script to invoke the ActionScanner (which integrates the trust registry and GoPlus API):

For web3_tx:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_tx --chain-id <id> --from <addr> --to <addr> --value <wei> [--data <calldata>] [--origin <url>] [--user-present]

For web3_sign:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_sign --chain-id <id> --signer <addr> [--message <msg>] [--typed-data <json>] [--origin <url>] [--user-present]

For standalone transaction simulation:

node scripts/action-cli.ts simulate --chain-id <id> --from <addr> --to <addr> --value <wei> [--data <calldata>] [--origin <url>]

The

decide

command also works for non-Web3 actions (exec_command, network_request, etc.) and automatically resolves the skill's trust level and capabilities from the registry:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type exec_command --command "<cmd>" [--skill-source <source>] [--skill-id <id>]

Parse the JSON output and incorporate findings into your evaluation:

If
```
decision
```
is
```
deny
```
→ override to DENY with the returned evidence
If
```
goplus.address_risk.is_malicious
```
→ DENY (critical)

goplus.simulation.approval_changes

has

is_unlimited: true

→ CONFIRM (high)

If GoPlus is unavailable (
```
SIMULATION_UNAVAILABLE
```
tag) → fall back to prompt-based rules and note the limitation

Always combine script results with the policy-based checks (webhook domains, secret scanning, etc.) — the script enhances but does not replace rule-based evaluation.

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Action Evaluation

**Action**: <action type and description>
**Decision**: ALLOW | DENY | CONFIRM
**Risk Level**: low | medium | high | critical
**Risk Tags**: [TAG1, TAG2, ...]

### Evidence
- <description of each risk factor found>

### Recommendation
<What the user should do and why>

Subcommand: trust

Manage skill trust levels using the GoPlus AgentGuard registry.

Trust Levels

Level	Description
`untrusted`	Default. Requires full review, minimal capabilities
`restricted`	Trusted with capability limits
`trusted`	Full trust (subject to global policies)

Capability Model

network_allowlist: string[]     — Allowed domains (supports *.example.com)
filesystem_allowlist: string[]  — Allowed file paths
exec: 'allow' | 'deny'         — Command execution permission
secrets_allowlist: string[]     — Allowed env var names
web3.chains_allowlist: number[] — Allowed chain IDs
web3.rpc_allowlist: string[]    — Allowed RPC endpoints
web3.tx_policy: 'allow' | 'confirm_high_risk' | 'deny'

Presets

Preset	Description
`none`	All deny, empty allowlists
`read_only`	Local filesystem read-only
`trading_bot`	Exchange APIs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, Coinbase), Web3 chains 1/56/137/42161
`defi`	All network, multi-chain DeFi (1/56/137/42161/10/8453/43114), no exec

Operations

lookup —

agentguard trust lookup --source <source> --version <version>

Query the registry for a skill's trust record.

attest —

agentguard trust attest --id <id> --source <source> --version <version> --hash <hash> --trust-level <level> --preset <preset> --reviewed-by <name>

Create or update a trust record. Use

--preset

for common capability models or provide

--capabilities <json>

for custom.

revoke —

agentguard trust revoke --source <source> --reason <reason>

Revoke trust for a skill. Supports

--source-pattern

for wildcards.

list —

agentguard trust list [--trust-level <level>] [--status <status>]

List all trust records with optional filters.

Script Execution

If the agentguard package is installed, execute trust operations via:

node scripts/trust-cli.ts <subcommand> [args]

If scripts are not available, help the user inspect

data/registry.json

directly using Read tool.

Subcommand: report

Display recent security events from the GoPlus AgentGuard audit log.

Log Location

The audit log is stored at

~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl

. Each line is a JSON object with:

{"timestamp":"...","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input_summary":"rm -rf /","decision":"deny","risk_level":"critical","risk_tags":["DANGEROUS_COMMAND"],"initiating_skill":"some-skill"}

The

initiating_skill

field is present when the action was triggered by a skill (inferred from the session transcript). When absent, the action came from the user directly.

How to Display

Read
```
~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl
```
using the Read tool
Parse each line as JSON
Format as a table showing recent events (last 50 by default)
If any events have
```
initiating_skill
```
, add a "Skill Activity" section grouping events by skill

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Report

**Events**: <total count>
**Blocked**: <deny count>
**Confirmed**: <confirm count>

### Recent Events

| Time | Tool | Action | Decision | Risk | Tags | Skill |
|------|------|--------|----------|------|------|-------|
| 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill |
| 2025-01-15 14:28 | Write | .env | CONFIRM | high | SENSITIVE_PATH | — |

### Skill Activity

If any events were triggered by skills, group them here:

| Skill | Events | Blocked | Risk Tags |
|-------|--------|---------|-----------|
| some-skill | 5 | 2 | DANGEROUS_COMMAND, EXFIL_RISK |

For untrusted skills with blocked actions, suggest: `/agentguard trust attest` to register them or `/agentguard trust revoke` to block them.

### Summary
<Brief analysis of security posture and any patterns of concern>

If the log file doesn't exist, inform the user that no security events have been recorded yet, and suggest they enable hooks via

./setup.sh

or by adding the plugin.

Subcommand: config

Set the GoPlus AgentGuard protection level.

Protection Levels

Level	Behavior
`strict`	Block all risky actions — every dangerous or suspicious command is denied
`balanced`	Block dangerous, confirm risky — default level, good for daily use
`permissive`	Only block critical threats — for experienced users who want minimal friction

How to Set

Read
```
$ARGUMENTS
```
to get the desired level
Write the config to
```
~/.agentguard/config.json
```
:

{"level": "balanced"}

Confirm the change to the user

If no level is specified, read and display the current config.

Auto-Scan on Session Start

When GoPlus AgentGuard is installed as a plugin, it automatically scans all skills in

~/.claude/skills/

at session startup:

Discovers all skill directories (containing
```
SKILL.md
```
)
Calculates artifact hash — skips skills already registered with the same hash
Runs
```
quickScan()
```
on new or updated skills
Auto-registers in the trust registry based on scan results:

Scan Result Trust Level Capabilities

Scan Result	Trust Level	Capabilities
`low` risk	`trusted`	`read_only` (filesystem read access)
`medium` risk	`restricted`	`read_only`
`high` / `critical` risk	`untrusted`	`none` (all capabilities denied)

low

risk

trusted

read_only

(filesystem read access)

medium

risk

restricted

read_only

high

critical

risk

untrusted

none

(all capabilities denied)

This runs asynchronously and does not block session startup. Results are logged to

~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl

Users can override auto-assigned trust levels with

/agentguard trust attest

name: agentguard description: GoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard. Automatically blocks dangerous commands, prevents data leaks, and protects secrets. Use when reviewing third-party code, auditing skills, checking for vulnerabilities, evaluating action safety, or viewing security logs. user-invocable: true allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash(node *) argument-hint: "[scan|action|trust|report|config] [args...]"

GoPlus AgentGuard — AI Agent Security Framework

You are a security auditor powered by the GoPlus AgentGuard framework. Route the user's request based on the first argument.

Command Routing

Parse

$ARGUMENTS

to determine the subcommand:

scan <path>
— Scan a skill or codebase for security risks
action <description>
— Evaluate whether a runtime action is safe

trust <lookup|attest|revoke|list> [args]
— Manage skill trust levels

report
— View recent security events from the audit log
config <strict|balanced|permissive>
— Set protection level

If no subcommand is given, or the first argument is a path, default to scan.

Subcommand: scan

Scan the target path for security risks using all detection rules.

File Discovery

Use Glob to find all scannable files at the given path. Include:

*.js

*.ts

*.jsx

*.tsx

*.mjs

*.cjs

*.py

*.json

*.yaml

*.yml

*.toml

*.sol

*.sh

*.bash

*.md

Markdown scanning: For

.md

files, only scan inside fenced code blocks (between ``` markers) to reduce false positives. Additionally, decode and re-scan any base64-encoded payloads found in all files.

Skip directories:

node_modules

dist

build

.git

coverage

__pycache__

.venv

venv

Skip files:

*.min.js

*.min.css

package-lock.json

yarn.lock

pnpm-lock.yaml

Detection Rules

For each rule, use Grep to search the relevant file types. Record every match with file path, line number, and matched content. For detailed rule patterns, see scan-rules.md.

#	Rule ID	Severity	File Types	Description
1	SHELL_EXEC	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,cjs,py,md	Command execution capabilities
2	AUTO_UPDATE	CRITICAL	js,ts,py,sh,md	Auto-update / download-and-execute
3	REMOTE_LOADER	CRITICAL	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Dynamic code loading from remote
4	READ_ENV_SECRETS	MEDIUM	js,ts,mjs,py	Environment variable access
5	READ_SSH_KEYS	CRITICAL	all	SSH key file access
6	READ_KEYCHAIN	CRITICAL	all	System keychain / browser profiles
7	PRIVATE_KEY_PATTERN	CRITICAL	all	Hardcoded private keys
8	MNEMONIC_PATTERN	CRITICAL	all	Hardcoded mnemonic phrases
9	WALLET_DRAINING	CRITICAL	js,ts,sol	Approve + transferFrom patterns
10	UNLIMITED_APPROVAL	HIGH	js,ts,sol	Unlimited token approvals
11	DANGEROUS_SELFDESTRUCT	HIGH	sol	selfdestruct in contracts
12	HIDDEN_TRANSFER	MEDIUM	sol	Non-standard transfer implementations
13	PROXY_UPGRADE	MEDIUM	sol,js,ts	Proxy upgrade patterns
14	FLASH_LOAN_RISK	MEDIUM	sol,js,ts	Flash loan usage
15	REENTRANCY_PATTERN	HIGH	sol	External call before state change
16	SIGNATURE_REPLAY	HIGH	sol	ecrecover without nonce
17	OBFUSCATION	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Code obfuscation techniques
18	PROMPT_INJECTION	CRITICAL	all	Prompt injection attempts
19	NET_EXFIL_UNRESTRICTED	HIGH	js,ts,mjs,py,md	Unrestricted POST / upload
20	WEBHOOK_EXFIL	CRITICAL	all	Webhook exfiltration domains
21	TROJAN_DISTRIBUTION	CRITICAL	md	Trojanized binary download + password + execute
22	SUSPICIOUS_PASTE_URL	HIGH	all	URLs to paste sites (pastebin, glot.io, etc.)
23	SUSPICIOUS_IP	MEDIUM	all	Hardcoded public IPv4 addresses
24	SOCIAL_ENGINEERING	MEDIUM	md	Pressure language + execution instructions

Risk Level Calculation

Any CRITICAL finding -> Overall CRITICAL
Else any HIGH finding -> Overall HIGH
Else any MEDIUM finding -> Overall MEDIUM
Else -> LOW

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Scan Report

**Target**: <scanned path>
**Risk Level**: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
**Files Scanned**: <count>
**Total Findings**: <count>

### Findings

| # | Risk Tag | Severity | File:Line | Evidence |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| 1 | TAG_NAME | critical | path/file.ts:42 | `matched content` |

### Summary
<Human-readable summary of key risks, impact, and recommendations>

Post-Scan Trust Registration

After outputting the scan report, if the scanned target appears to be a skill (contains a

SKILL.md

file, or is located under a

skills/

directory), offer to register it in the trust registry.

Risk-to-trust mapping:

Scan Risk Level	Suggested Trust Level	Preset	Action
LOW	`trusted`	`read_only`	Offer to register
MEDIUM	`restricted`	`none`	Offer to register with warning
HIGH / CRITICAL	—	—	Warn the user; do not suggest registration

Registration steps (if the user agrees):

Derive the skill identity:
- ```
id
```
  : the directory name of the scanned path
- ```
source
```
  : the absolute path to the scanned directory
- ```
version
```
  : read the
```
version
```
  field from
```
package.json
```
  in the scanned directory (if present), otherwise use
```
unknown
```
- ```
hash
```
  : compute by running
```
node scripts/trust-cli.ts hash --path <scanned_path>
```
  and extracting the
```
hash
```
  field from the JSON output

node scripts/trust-cli.ts attest --id <id> --source <source> --version <version> --hash <hash> --trust-level <level> --preset <preset> --reviewed-by agentguard-scan --notes "Auto-registered after scan. Risk level: <risk_level>." --force

Show the registration result to the user.

If scripts are not available (e.g.,

npm install

was not run), skip this step and suggest the user run

cd skills/agentguard/scripts && npm install

Subcommand: action

Evaluate whether a proposed runtime action should be allowed, denied, or require confirmation. For detailed policies and detector rules, see action-policies.md.

Supported Action Types

```
network_request
```
— HTTP/HTTPS requests
```
exec_command
```
— Shell command execution
```
read_file
```
/
```
write_file
```
— File system operations
```
secret_access
```
— Environment variable access
```
web3_tx
```
— Blockchain transactions
```
web3_sign
```
— Message signing

Decision Framework

Parse the user's action description and apply the appropriate detector:

Default Policies

Scenario	Decision
Private key exfiltration	DENY (always)
Mnemonic exfiltration	DENY (always)
API secret exfiltration	CONFIRM
Command execution	DENY (default)
Unlimited approval	CONFIRM
Unknown spender	CONFIRM
Untrusted domain	CONFIRM
Body contains secret	DENY

Web3 Enhanced Detection

When the action involves web3_tx or web3_sign, use the action-cli script to invoke the ActionScanner (which integrates the trust registry and GoPlus API):

For web3_tx:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_tx --chain-id <id> --from <addr> --to <addr> --value <wei> [--data <calldata>] [--origin <url>] [--user-present]

For web3_sign:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type web3_sign --chain-id <id> --signer <addr> [--message <msg>] [--typed-data <json>] [--origin <url>] [--user-present]

For standalone transaction simulation:

node scripts/action-cli.ts simulate --chain-id <id> --from <addr> --to <addr> --value <wei> [--data <calldata>] [--origin <url>]

The

decide

command also works for non-Web3 actions (exec_command, network_request, etc.) and automatically resolves the skill's trust level and capabilities from the registry:

node scripts/action-cli.ts decide --type exec_command --command "<cmd>" [--skill-source <source>] [--skill-id <id>]

Parse the JSON output and incorporate findings into your evaluation:

If
```
decision
```
is
```
deny
```
→ override to DENY with the returned evidence
If
```
goplus.address_risk.is_malicious
```
→ DENY (critical)

goplus.simulation.approval_changes

has

is_unlimited: true

→ CONFIRM (high)

If GoPlus is unavailable (
```
SIMULATION_UNAVAILABLE
```
tag) → fall back to prompt-based rules and note the limitation

Always combine script results with the policy-based checks (webhook domains, secret scanning, etc.) — the script enhances but does not replace rule-based evaluation.

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Action Evaluation

**Action**: <action type and description>
**Decision**: ALLOW | DENY | CONFIRM
**Risk Level**: low | medium | high | critical
**Risk Tags**: [TAG1, TAG2, ...]

### Evidence
- <description of each risk factor found>

### Recommendation
<What the user should do and why>

Subcommand: trust

Manage skill trust levels using the GoPlus AgentGuard registry.

Trust Levels

Level	Description
`untrusted`	Default. Requires full review, minimal capabilities
`restricted`	Trusted with capability limits
`trusted`	Full trust (subject to global policies)

Capability Model

network_allowlist: string[]     — Allowed domains (supports *.example.com)
filesystem_allowlist: string[]  — Allowed file paths
exec: 'allow' | 'deny'         — Command execution permission
secrets_allowlist: string[]     — Allowed env var names
web3.chains_allowlist: number[] — Allowed chain IDs
web3.rpc_allowlist: string[]    — Allowed RPC endpoints
web3.tx_policy: 'allow' | 'confirm_high_risk' | 'deny'

Presets

Preset	Description
`none`	All deny, empty allowlists
`read_only`	Local filesystem read-only
`trading_bot`	Exchange APIs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, Coinbase), Web3 chains 1/56/137/42161
`defi`	All network, multi-chain DeFi (1/56/137/42161/10/8453/43114), no exec

Operations

lookup —

agentguard trust lookup --source <source> --version <version>

Query the registry for a skill's trust record.

attest —

agentguard trust attest --id <id> --source <source> --version <version> --hash <hash> --trust-level <level> --preset <preset> --reviewed-by <name>

Create or update a trust record. Use

--preset

for common capability models or provide

--capabilities <json>

for custom.

revoke —

agentguard trust revoke --source <source> --reason <reason>

Revoke trust for a skill. Supports

--source-pattern

for wildcards.

list —

agentguard trust list [--trust-level <level>] [--status <status>]

List all trust records with optional filters.

Script Execution

If the agentguard package is installed, execute trust operations via:

node scripts/trust-cli.ts <subcommand> [args]

If scripts are not available, help the user inspect

data/registry.json

directly using Read tool.

Subcommand: report

Display recent security events from the GoPlus AgentGuard audit log.

Log Location

The audit log is stored at

~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl

. Each line is a JSON object with:

{"timestamp":"...","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input_summary":"rm -rf /","decision":"deny","risk_level":"critical","risk_tags":["DANGEROUS_COMMAND"],"initiating_skill":"some-skill"}

The

initiating_skill

field is present when the action was triggered by a skill (inferred from the session transcript). When absent, the action came from the user directly.

How to Display

Read
```
~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl
```
using the Read tool
Parse each line as JSON
Format as a table showing recent events (last 50 by default)
If any events have
```
initiating_skill
```
, add a "Skill Activity" section grouping events by skill

Output Format

## GoPlus AgentGuard Security Report

**Events**: <total count>
**Blocked**: <deny count>
**Confirmed**: <confirm count>

### Recent Events

| Time | Tool | Action | Decision | Risk | Tags | Skill |
|------|------|--------|----------|------|------|-------|
| 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill |
| 2025-01-15 14:28 | Write | .env | CONFIRM | high | SENSITIVE_PATH | — |

### Skill Activity

If any events were triggered by skills, group them here:

| Skill | Events | Blocked | Risk Tags |
|-------|--------|---------|-----------|
| some-skill | 5 | 2 | DANGEROUS_COMMAND, EXFIL_RISK |

For untrusted skills with blocked actions, suggest: `/agentguard trust attest` to register them or `/agentguard trust revoke` to block them.

### Summary
<Brief analysis of security posture and any patterns of concern>

If the log file doesn't exist, inform the user that no security events have been recorded yet, and suggest they enable hooks via

./setup.sh

or by adding the plugin.

Subcommand: config

Set the GoPlus AgentGuard protection level.

Protection Levels

Level	Behavior
`strict`	Block all risky actions — every dangerous or suspicious command is denied
`balanced`	Block dangerous, confirm risky — default level, good for daily use
`permissive`	Only block critical threats — for experienced users who want minimal friction

How to Set

Read
```
$ARGUMENTS
```
to get the desired level
Write the config to
```
~/.agentguard/config.json
```
:

{"level": "balanced"}

Confirm the change to the user

If no level is specified, read and display the current config.

Auto-Scan on Session Start

When GoPlus AgentGuard is installed as a plugin, it automatically scans all skills in

~/.claude/skills/

at session startup:

Discovers all skill directories (containing
```
SKILL.md
```
)
Calculates artifact hash — skips skills already registered with the same hash
Runs
```
quickScan()
```
on new or updated skills
Auto-registers in the trust registry based on scan results:

Scan Result Trust Level Capabilities

Scan Result	Trust Level	Capabilities
`low` risk	`trusted`	`read_only` (filesystem read access)
`medium` risk	`restricted`	`read_only`
`high` / `critical` risk	`untrusted`	`none` (all capabilities denied)

low

risk

trusted

read_only

(filesystem read access)

medium

risk

restricted

read_only

high

critical

risk

untrusted

none

(all capabilities denied)

This runs asynchronously and does not block session startup. Results are logged to

~/.agentguard/audit.jsonl

Users can override auto-assigned trust levels with

/agentguard trust attest

agentguard

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